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MODELING THE EFFECT OF FISHERY ATTRIBUTES ON
PARTICIPATION RATES AND ANGLER WELFARE:
THE KENAI PENINSULA MARINE SPORT FISHERY
S. Todd Lee, Mark Herrmann, Keith R. Criddle, and Charles Hamel

ABSTRACT

Changes in sportfishing trip attributes such as cost, harvest regulations, environmental
quality, and resource abundance, affect both the expected net benefits associated with a fishing
trip and participation decisions. The ability to estimate both of these is important for various
types of policy analysis. This study uses stated preference questions of anglers who sport fished
in the marine waters off the Kenai Peninsula. Alaska to estimate a nonlinear random effects
probit model that expresses both angler net benefits and participation rates as functions of trip
attributes. The use of stated preference data along with a nonlinear utility specification allows
for the simulation of a wide range of policy scenarios. The study design permits the
identification of substitution and complementary effects across fishing trip attributes, as well as
nonlinear marginal utility.
Key words: compensating variation, participation rate, random effects probit, sport fishery,
stated preference method

MODELING THE EFFECT OF FISHERY ATTRIBUTES ON
PARTICIPATION RATES AND ANGLER WELFARE:
THE KENAI PENINSULA MARINE SPORT FISHERY·
Introduction

The modeling and results presented are based on a stated preference survey. Each angler was
presented a set of possible fishing trips that vary in their levels of trip attributes. Anglers were asked to
identify which trips they would take. The attributes evaluated included the target species (Pacific halibut

-Hippoglossus stenolepis, chinook salmon-Oncorhynchus tshawytscha, and coho salmon-D. kisutch) ,
the number and size of fish caught, and the cost of the trip. The advantage of this approach is that it is
possible to construct experimental designs that allow for substitution and complementary effects across
attributes, and that allow for the possibility of nonlinear marginal utility. These types of effects are often
difficult to capture from observed activity where attributes can be highly collinear or lack sufficient
variation. We elicit preferences on a trip-by-trip basis through a binary choice variable that indicates
whether the angler would take the trip that is presented. This design results in a panel type data set.
We use the estimated parameters from a random effects probit model to simulate changes in
participation rates, as well as angler welfare (compensating variation), associated with changes in the
fishing trip attributes. The ability to simulate angler welfare is important for benefit/cost analyses of
regulations and natural resource damage assessment. The ability to forecast changes in participation rates
is also important in many policy settings and for economic impact or input/output analyses. Participation
rate forecasts provide a crucial link between a change in the characteristics of a fishery and the resulting
change in economic activity.
Several current policy initiatives in Alaska have highlighted the importance of modeling the value of
recreational fisheries and angler participation rates. One example is the leasing of offshore drilling rights.
Such leases require an economic impact analysis that describes how local communities would be affected
by oil spills (Cohen, Herrmann et al. 2001a). Since an oil spill may affect recreational catch rates, it is
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important to understand how this would translate into changes in angler welfare and participation rates.
Such information can then be used in both benefit/cost and economic impact analyses.
Another example is the Pacific halibut allocation issue faced by the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council (Council) in Alaska between commercial and sport catches of halibut. (On the
Kenai Peninsula, this issue has become further complicated by a recent rural preference ruling, which will
place a greater importance on the subsistence fisheries (Manning and Little).) During the past two
decades, the share of halibut catch taken by the sport fishery has grown from less than 2% to over 18%.
The Council has considered several measures to constrain further expansion of the sport catch, such as
bag limit reductions, season restrictions, and limits on the number of rods per boat (NPFMC) and has also
indicated an interest in development of an individual fishing quota (lFQ) for charter operators. However,
the effectiveness of these measures is dependent on how responsive anglers are to changes in these trip
attributes. Consequently, the ability to forecast changes in participation rates is important in many policy
settings.
Previous studies have used demographic characteristics to explain changes in the demand for
recreational fishing (Holland and Ditton; Aas; Thunberg et al.). The disadvantage of these models is that
the resulting forecasts are conditional on conjectures about demographic change. That is, such models
simply shift the focus from forecasting changes in participation to predicting demographic change.
Moreover, demography-based participation models are ill-suited for predicting changes in the demand for
recreational fishing that might arise in response to changes in trip costs, fishing conditions, or
management actions. Our approach avoids these problems by focusing on explanatory variables that are
subject to direct control. Consequently, our model is better suited for policy evaluation and for
forecasting participation rate responses to changes in trip costs and catch rates.
In the next section we present the econometric model. We then discuss the study design and data
collection. Two result sections are then presented: one for changes in participation and another for
changes in angler welfare. We have summary and concluding remarks at the end.

3
Econometric Model
The participation decision was modeled using a random utility framework where the utility of individual
i associated with trip t is given by

(1)

i

= 1,2, . .. ,N t = 1,2, ... ,T

The vector, Xu, describes the attributes of the t-th trip taken by the i -th individual. Socioeconomic and
demographic variables for the i -th individual are included in the vector Zi'

/3

and , are vectors of

parameters associated with the fishing trip attributes and socioeconomic variables, respectively. The
errors, eu, are normally distributed with an expected value of zero.
Respondents were asked whether they would take trip t, described by attributes Xu. The i -th
respondent who takes trip t obtains a utility level of Uu . Those who do not take trip t receive
(2)
the utility level associated with not taking the trip, which is also the opportunity cost of taking trip t .
Since the actual levels of utility are unobservable, the model is made operational by specifying a binary
indicator y * that denotes which choice was made, that is, y~ = 1 if respondent i would take trip t and
y~ = 0 otherwise. Assuming that individual i makes the utility maximizing choice, y~ = 1 implies that

the expected utility of taking trip t is greater than the expected utility of not taking the trip, that is,
E (uu 2:

Uw ). Conversely, y~

= 0 implies that E (uu

< Uw ).

A probabilistic choice model can then be formulated by noting that

p[y*
(3)

= 11 XU,Zi] = P[uu 2: uw]
= P [f ( Xu , Zi, /3, , ) + eu 2: f ( 0, Zi, /3, , ) + ew ]
=
=

where

Cit

=

P[f(XU,zi,/3,,)- f(O,zi,/3,,)+eit -ew 2: 0]
P[f( xU,zi,/3,,) - f( O,zi,/3,,) + cit 2: 0]

eit - ew .

Several econometric models are appropriate for binary choice panel data. The two most widely
applied are: the fixed effects model (Chamberlain); and, the random effects model (Butler and Moffitt).
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The fixed effects model assumes that individual heterogeneity must be captured by individual specific
parametric shifts in the response function, thus it is appropriate for forecasting responses for those
particular individuals. In contrast, the random effects model assumes that individual's responses are
correlated with themselves. Consequently, the random effects framework is more appropriate when the
data are a random sample of individuals from a larger population of interest (Maddala; Greene, 1997).
Moreover, the random effects model allows inclusion of variables that do not vary across trips (e.g.,
socioeconomic variables, Zi), while the fixed effect model does not.
The random effects model assumes that the error term in equation (3) is the sum of two independently
distributed components: one (/-Lit) that varies across individuals and trips and another ( Vi ) that only varies
across individuals. That is,

Cit

=

/-Lit

+ Vi , where each component is from an independent normal

distribution with zero mean and unit variance. The model is therefore called a random effects probit
model. The /-Lit are usually assumed to have constant correlation across t , an assumption that greatly
reduces the dimensionality of the problem, and requires the estimation of only one additional parameter,
p =

Corr ( Cit ,Cir ) . The presence of a statistically significant random effect can be tested using the

estimated t-statistic for p . The approach taken in this paper is to use the model of Butler and Moffitt and
test for the presence of a random effect. A Monte Carlo experiment by Guilkey and Murphy has shown
that use of the standard binomial probit model in cases where there is a random effect, can bias the
estimates of the parameters' standard errors.

Study Design

Survey Administration and Response Rate-The modeling and results presented in this section are based
on a stated preference survey described in Lee et al. The survey was developed and administered
following the Total Design Method (Dillman). Surveys were mailed to a random sample of 4,000 sport
fishers drawn from the population of U.S. residents who purchased 1997 Alaska State sportfishing
licenses. Alaskans comprised 49.3% of the sample, closely resembling their actual license sales
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proportion (49.7%). Sampled license holders received one of nine versions of the survey during the first
mailing, followed by a reminder card. Non-respondents were sent a second survey 14 days after the initial
survey was mailed. The first two survey mailings and the reminder card were sent by first class mail. A
third survey was sent by certified mail to those who did not respond within 14 days after the second
survey was mailed. All survey mailings contained a cover letter, a prize entry card (to increase the
response rate), a business reply envelope, and survey. A total of2,640 completed, or partially completed,
surveys were returned for an overall response rate of 70.1 % based on delivered surveys. For more details
and summary of the survey see Lee et al. and Herrmann et al. 2001 b.

Construction of Trips-In addition to being asked to provide information about various economic and
demographic variables and actual trips taken, respondents were presented a set of hypothetical fishing
trips, and asked to identify which trips they would take. Each trip was composed of six fishing attributes
and a cost per day. Respondents were told that the cost per day is for fishing related costs such as tackle
and bait purchased specifically for the trip, charter/guide fees, and trip specific transportation costs such
as auto and boat fuel. The trip attributes were the average size and number of halibut, chinook, and coho
caught. The cost per day was identified as the sum of sportfishing related costs such as tackle and bait
purchased specifically for the trip, charter/guide fees, and trip specific transportation costs such as auto
and boat fuel.
Trip-by-trip preferences were elicited through a binary choice variable that indicated whether the
respondent would take a particular hypothetical trip. The advantage of this approach is that it is possible
to construct an experimental design that allows for substitution and complementary effects across
attributes, and for the possibility of nonlinear marginal utility. While these types of effects are predicted
by economic theory, they are difficult to identify in empirical studies of actual trips because attributes are
often highly collinear or lack sufficient variation. Hypothetical trip attributes were derived from historical
means (Howe et al.) and through pre-test discussions with anglers. Table 1 lists the attribute levels used.
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These attribute levels combine to describe 4,608 unique trips. However, some of these hypothetical
trips are nonsensical or implausible and were dropped from consideration. For example, trips where no
fish are caught, but the average weight is positive are nonsensical. Similarly, trips with positive catches of
all three species during one day are implausible. The SAS Optex procedure was used to rank experimental
designs based on the D-optimality criterion (SAS). The D-optimality criterion maximizes the determinant
of the information matrix, X'X . Block designs with large D-optimality scores have a greater potential for
elucidating the effect of individual attributes. Block designs where at least one trip dominates at least one
other trip were also dropped from further consideration. The domination criterion only assumed that
preferences are such that large fish are preferred to small fish (within a species), that more catch is
preferred to less catch (within a species), and that lower cost is preferred. While this approach has the
advantage of maximizing the information content of the stated preference observations, it does not allow
testing of the transitivity of preferences. Based on projected survey returns, nine three-trip blocks (27
unique trips) were selected for use in the survey. Each of the 4,000 surveys was randomly assigned one of
the nine blocks of three hypothetical trips. This design results in a panel data set with multiple
observations on each respondent's participation choices.

Econometric Model Estimates

To ensure that the participation decisions were grounded in recent experience, coefficient estimation was
based on the 352 surveys returned by respondents who took at least one salmon or halibut sportfishing
trip in marine waters off the Kenai Peninsula during 1997. Each respondent answered questions regarding
three different hypothetical trips, yielding a total of 1,056 observations. The socioeconomic data provided
by the respondents included household after tax income, gender (a binary indicator variable equal to one
if the individual is male and zero otherwise), age (years), education (a binary indicator variable equal to
one if the individual is a college graduate), and a categorical variable to differentiate between Alaskan
residents and nonresidents. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2.
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Utility was modeled as a hybrid quadratic function to allow for non-constant marginal utility and
substitution/complementarily effects across species. This functional form can also accommodate
socioeconomic variables, and because polynomial models are linear in their parameters it is
straightforward to estimate. Catch and average size were combined to create the variable

W

for each

species that represents the weight of the fish measured in pounds. This allows for a more parsimonious
model given the large number of parameters that need to be estimated, allows for the identification of all
quadratic terms, and can be modified to add separate variables (species catch or species size) where
appropriate. The fish weight variables, the products of halibut, chinook salmon, and coho salmon catches
and weights, are denoted

Whalibut, Wchinook,

and

Wcoho,

respectively. The variables Halibut and

Halibut 2 were included to allow for additional variation that was due to catch alone. 2 P denotes the per
day cost of the fishing trip. The model to be estimated, including the demographic variables is

(4)

y7t =/30 + 0s
~ /3swus' + 0}0s
~ . ~ AsWitsWU}'
'
,
+7r p P

+ 7rHc Halibut + 7rHc 2Halibut 2 + ~tfIZi,l

where sand j index species (halibut, chinook, coho), and the

z, are categorical variables representing Per-

capita Household Income, Gender, Age, and Education. Equation (4) was estimated along with indicator
variables to differentiate between Alaskans and nonresidents. 3 Because the same general study design was
presented to each group, we only estimate one random effect parameter. 4
The model was estimated with Limdep 7.0 for Windows (Greene, 1998). The estimated coefficients
are reported in Table 3. The random effect parameter, p, is statistically different from zero at the 99%
level (p = 0.0057), Supporting the presence of an identifiable random effect. A total of 35 different
parameters were estimated. Fifteen of the parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1% level,
ten additional parameters are significant at the 5% level and two are significant at the 10% level. The
point estimates of the parameters accord well with economic theory. The price coefficients are negative,
as expected. The coefficients on halibut, chinook salmon, and coho salmon weights and halibut catches
are all positive. The weight squared terms and the cross terms are all negative, implying that anglers
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experience decreasing marginal utility and that each of each species are substitutes for catches of the
others. The log likelihood at convergence is 542.503 and the log likelihood was 731.047 when the
parameters were set to zero. The McFadden R2 is 0.249 and the Veall and Zimmermann R2 is 0.442.

Simulating Changes is Participation
Method - The simulation model employs the sample enumeration method discussed in BenAkiva and

Lerman. The sample enumeration method takes into account differences in socioeconomic characteristics
and variability in the number of days fished per year by developing forecasts for each individual in the
sample. We use this information to weight the simulations by the number of days fished. 5 The simulation
provides separate results for Alaskans and nonresidents.
The general formula for all forecasts is

(5)

where Ui,j is the forecast of indirect utility for individual i with the fishing attributes j, j = 0 denotes
the initial or starting point fishing trip attributes and j

= 1 denotes the new fishing trip attribute levels

based on an a-percent change from the j = 0 levels, %D. means percentage change, <I> ( • ) is the
cumulative standard normal distribution function, and daysi is the number of days individual i fished in
saltwater off the Kenai Peninsula in 1997.

Results -Base results and simulations reported for 1997-98 trip attributes averaged across shore, private

boat and charter fishing activities (see Table 4). The wide difference in costs, and average landings,
between resident and nonresident fishermen partly reflects the increased percent of charter activity in the
nonresident mix of trip types as compared to the residents. At the average trip attributes for all species
there is an 80.4% probability that an Alaskan would take the trip and a 84.6% probability that a
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nonresident would take the trip. For the halibut only trips there is an 88.0% and 81.2% probability of an
Alaskan and nonresident taking the trip respectively.
More interesting than the probabilities of a trip taken is the change in probabilities of a trip given
changes in trip attributes. The first set of simulations shows the responsiveness of the participation rate to
changes in the fishing cost, or price per sportfishing day, using base trip catches and weights. Changes in
the probability that an average sport fisher would take a sportfishing trip are explored in simulations of
three different costs per sportfishing day, as each cost per day is decreased and increased over a ± 20%
interval. The results are represented in Figure 1 and Table 5. Figure 1 show the effect of changes in the
price or cost per day of fishing at three different price levels ($50, $125 and $200). Since the utility
function is non-linear in the estimated parameters, the slope of each curve is different. Deviations in price
around $200 has a larger effect than deviations in price around $50, as economic theory would suggest. A
measure of price elasticity can be determined by dividing the percentage change in the probability of
taking a trip by the percent change in the cost. As expected, elasticity is an increasing function of cost per
day for both residents and nonresidents, and the response of Alaskans is more elastic than that of
nonresidents. It is interesting to note that price is relatively inelastic for costs per day similar to those
observed during actual fishing trips, $56.52 for Alaskans and $130.71 for nonresidents.
We also modeled changes in participation as a consequence of changes in the expected catch using
equation (5) and the trip attributes from Table 4. The averages are weighted by the number of days each
participant fished in 1997. The first panel in Figure 2 depicts changes in the probability that an average
angler would take a sportfishing trip where all three species are caught. The figure shows how
participation rates respond to simultaneous changes in the catch of all three species. Both resident and
nonresident sport fishers respond to negative changes in a similar manner. This results from the estimated
decreasing marginal values of catch of each species. The response to positive changes is smaller,
especially for nonresidents. The second panel in Figure 2 uses data from trips where only halibut are
targeted (see Table 3). Again, the response is quite similar across residency category. Anglers are more
responsive to catch decreases than catch increases.
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Because the point estimates of percentage changes in the number of sportfishing days are highly nonlinear, the 90% confidence intervals were simulated using the method proposed by Krinsky and Robb,
using 10,000 Monte Carlo draws. These confidence intervals are presented in Table 5. In absolute
magnitude, the 900/0 bounds are generally larger for Alaska residents than for nonresidents. These results
suggest, for example, that a 10% reduction in expected catch will lead to a 9.32% reduction in the
probability that the average Alaskan, who participated in the 1997 or 1998 Kenai Peninsula marine, sport
fishery for salmon or halibut, would take a halibut or salmon sportfishing trip, and a 5.82% reduction in
the corresponding probability for the average nonresident. When these probabilities are applied to the
population of sport fishers, they suggests that a 10% reduction in catch can be expected to result in the
same reduction percentage in the number of resident and nonresident sportfishing-days. The 90%
confidence intervals suggest that there is a 90% probability that a 10% reduction in expected catch will
reduce the number of sportfishing-days by between 4.35% and 16.26% for Alaskans and between 3.46%
and 8.93% for nonresidents (Table 4). If sportfishing catches are proportional to biomass, application of
the probabilities represented in Table 4 to the population of sport fishers provides estimates of percentage
changes in the number of sportfishing-days in the lower Cook Inlet salmon and halibut sport fisheries.
Moreover, Table 4 can be interpreted as representing the probable changes in participation that would
result from changes in the availability of fish.
Examination of Table 4 and Figure 2 highlights several important features of the model and results.
First, the model exhibits diminishing marginal returns. For example, a 10% increase in expected catch
will increase expected participation by 6.97% for Alaskan residents. Increasing expected catch from
110% of the 1997 mean to 120% of the 1997 mean would lead to a smaller incremental participation
increase of 5.00% (11.97%-6.97%), etc. Second, nonresidents are less responsive to changes in expected
catch than residents. This result is consistent with the widely accepted belief that nonresidents are more
strongly motivated by the fishing experience than by the consumptive value of the catch. It is also
consistent with Alaskans having greater opportunities for substitution. Third, confidence intervals are
narrower for nonresidents than Alaskans, suggesting that nonresidents are more homogenous than
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residents, and suggesting that greater confidence can be placed in forecasts of changes in nonresident
participation than in forecasts of resident participation.
The discussion of these participation-rate simulations has suggested that changes in expected catch
rates approximately reflect changes in biomass. While this characterization approximates the constant
exploitation yield strategy applied in halibut management, it is less representative of the constant
escapement strategy applied to salmon. Moreover, even where there is a close linkage between biomass or
abundance and target catches, the allocation among commercial, subsistence, and sport fishers is not
invariant. For example, policy makers could distribute all downside risk to the commercial sector, thereby
insulating the recreational and subsistence sectors from the effects of population fluctuations. Another
likely phenomenon in the long run is that recreational fishers will have increased access to alternative
fishing sites (e.g., Valdez, Whittier, Cordova, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor). Another assumption in this is that
the news of the reduced expected catches is instantaneous. In reality, it may take a while for reduced
expected catches to be realized by the public, delaying the onset of participation rate reductions.
However, participation reductions may be larger than indicated by the model for expected catch
reductions occasioned by anthropogenic environmental damages. Finally, this model explicitly assumes a
perfectly elastic supply curve for shore, private, and charter trips. While this is true for shore and private
trips it is not necessarily true for charter trips. For example, as a short-run response to an environmental
disaster that reduced the desirability of Cook Inlet sportfishing trips, charter operators might choose to
reduce their prices (discounted trips). To the extent that this occurs, the model will overestimate changes
in participation.

Simulating Changes in Angler Welfare
Method - Compensating variations (CV) can be thought of as an additional cost that, if added to the cost

of a particular sportfishing trip, would leave the angler indifferent between taking and not taking the trip.
CV can be estimated from the participation rate model. It should be noted that since the econometric
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model is linear in the price parameter, the marginal utility of income is assumed to be constant within the
Alaskan and nonresident groups. In this case, compensating variation is identical to equivalent variation.
The expected level of CV corresponding to a fishing trip with attributes of a given level can be
calculated from the estimated participation rate model by employing formulas similar to those presented
in Hanemann (1999). Let the expected maximum utility from each choice be represented by
M = E (max (u 1, Uo )) , where u 1 = vl
Uo = Vo

+ eo

+ el

denotes the utility received from taking a fishing trip and

denotes the utility received from not taking a fishing trip. The economic welfare associated

with the choice occasion is therefore CV

welfare measure and

7r p

= M/

/7r p

,where CV represents the compensating variation

is the marginal utility of income and is equal to the coefficient estimate on the

price (cost of trip) variable. Since the marginal utility of income is constant in our econometric model,
this welfare measure is also the equivalent variation welfare measure.
Using standard probability theory, M is calculated by evaluating

where ¢ ( .) is the bivariate normal probability density function. If we normalize the utility of not taking a
trip such that Uo = 0, then a trip will only be taken when Vl

+ el 2: 0, and

Note that the lower limit of integration ensures that a trip will be taken if Vl

M simplifies to

+ el 2: 0 .

The individual's estimated compensating variation is then given by

(6)
where

cij

is the compensating variation for person i and trip j. The weighted average compensating

variation across all individuals is
n

n

i=l

i=l

(7)
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where dij is the individual's total number of Lower and Central Cook Inlet salmon and halibut
sportfishing-days fished in as reported by ADF&G in 1997 (therefore dyif>(uij) is the individual's days
fished for a trip j with corresponding attributes).
The estimated compensating variation is then

Cs = cBDB (1 +% ~ Participationa ) ,

(8)

where DB is the total number of salmon and halibut sportfishing-days taken in Lower or Central Cook
Inlet by all individuals, according to desired grouping, as reported by ADF&G for the baseline 1997
season.
Changes in compensating variations will then be calculated as

C~=Cs-Cs,

(9)

Results - Average estimated daily (and total) compensating variation is reported in Table 6 for trips where
any species was targeted. The estimated daily average compensating variations are $80.33 for Alaskans
and $118.88 for nonresidents. Total compensating variation is $19.2 million ($10.3 million for
nonresidents and $8.9 million for residents). To simulate changes in compensating variation, when
expected fishery attributes change, the expected number of sport fishers is multiplied against the
simulated average compensating variation. The total compensating variations for simulated changes in
expected catch are reported in Table 7 and represented in Figures 3 and 4.
For a 10% decrease in expected sportfishing catches of halibut and salmon the estimated
compensating variation for declines $4.4 million (from $19.2 to $14.8 million). At 20% decline in
expected catch, compensating variations decline to approximately $10.6 million. These relatively large
decreases are due to both a reduction in the number of participants accompanied by a decrease in the
compensating variations for the remaining participants, reflecting the decrease in the quality of their trip.
Percentage wise, in all cases, the compensating variations decrease faster for residents than nonresidents
reflecting differential access to substitute activities or differences in the relative import of consumptive
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and non-consumptive aspects of sportfishing. For example, for a 20% decrease in expected harvest, the
compensating variations of Alaskan residents decrease by 34% while nonresident compensating
variations drop only 19%. Table 8 contains the 90% confidence intervals of per day CV associated with
various changes in the catch of all species. As with the confidence intervals estimated for changes in the
participation rate, these were simulated using the Krinsky -Robb method.

Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents a model that was designed to predict participation rates and welfare given angler and
fishery attributes. Because actual observed trip activity may lack sufficient trip attribute variation, or have
attributes that are highly collinear, it may be difficult to estimate an econometric model that will predict
desired alternatives. Our model uses hypothetical trips, from a survey of Kenai Peninsula marine sport
fishers, to elicit fishing preferences on a trip-by-trip basis through a binary choice variable that indicates
whether the angler would take the trip that is presented. The model is non-linear allowing for both
substitutional and complimentary effects across trip attributes and diminishing marginal utility and is
estimated using the random effects pro bit model.
Estimation results are consistent with expectations in the Kenai Peninsula marine sport fishery. The
major target species are estimated to be substitutes and marginal utility diminishes with increased catch
rates. Simulations on reported 1997-98 trip attributes indicate that there is a high probability that most
fishermen would have taken the average trip if presented with the trip attributes a priori. Simulations
indicate that, at the current trip attributes, that the trip elasticities (in relation to trip costs) are inelastic,
particularly for nonresidents. As theory would predict, these elasticities become more elastic at higher trip
costs. A second set of simulations indicates that there is a decreasing marginal utility to increased catches.
This set of simulations can be modified to answer questions of changes in expected catch by species.
These latter simulations are important because they can be used to address a wide variety of issues
including potential fishery policy changes, natural resource damage assessment, and the measurement of
economic benefits. Changes to economic benefits are illustrated by linking changes in fishing trip
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attributes to changes in compensating variation. Reductions in expected catch reduce the compensating
variation in two ways. First, the marginal participant will drop out of the fishery as the expected benefits
(in terms of catch) decrease, thereby decreasing the total net benefits of the sportfishing. Second, the net
benefit of taking a trip is also reduced for those who continue to participate because the average trip
produces less net benefit when the catch rate declines. The same is true in reverse. These models can also
be used in economic impact (input-output analysis). The ability to forecast changes in participation rates
provides a crucial link between a change in the characteristics of a fishery and the resulting change in an
economic activity.
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Footnotes
IThe product of the number of categories of each attribute: 3 cost levels, 4 halibut catch levels, 4 halibut
average sizes, 3 chinook catch levels, 4 chinook average sizes, 4 coho catch levels, and 2 coho average
sIzes.
2Variables

for coho and chinook catch were not included because there was only one size categories for

coho salmon and only two catch levels for chinook, consequently catch and size are highly collinear with
weight.
3The p-value on the null hypothesis that all parameters are the same across Alaskans and nonresidents is
0.18. Although not statistically significant, we have chosen to model the Alaskans and nonresidents
separately because many of the individual and grouped parameters are statistically different from each
other and the evaluation of certain policy considerations necessitates separate estimates.
4 Furthermore,

the p-value for the null hypothesis that

PAK = Pother US

is 0.52 (X 2 = 0.4134 with 1

degree of freedom), indicating that it is unlikely that they do not share a common random effect
parameter.
SIn practice, weighting by the number of days fished has a very small effect of the simulations. This is
because the demographic variables are much less "important" than the fishing attribute variables in terms
of making a forecast. Since the fishing attribute variables are constant across all individuals within the
Alaskan and nonresident designations, the effect of weighting by days fished is very small.
6This

is true when income is linear in the utility function, as it is in our case (Hanneman).
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Table 1. Hl:Eothetical triE attribute levels.
Attribute
Cost per day ($)
Halibut catch per day
Average halibut weight (lbs.)
Chinook salmon catch per day
A verage chinook salmon weight (lbs.)
Coho salmon catch per day
Average coho salmon weight (lbs.)

Level
100
0
0
0
0
0
0

170
2
20
1
15
2
7

240
4
40
2
25
4

6
80
50
6

Table2. Statistical summary of resEondents' socioeconomic characteristics.
Alaskans N=158
Nonresidents N=194
Max
Mean Std. Dev. Min
Max
Mean Std. Dev. Min
Per Capita Household
$21,580 $12,660
$200 $70,000 $28,140 $17,020 $2,500 $110,000
Income
Gender (1 =male)
o
1
o
1
0.734
0.753
0.443
0.433
48.139 14.321 16
83
Age
74
42.373 11.982 17
o
1
0.500
0.501
o
1
Education (1 = college
0.348
0.478
graduate)
4.229
5.025
48
9.101 11.905
63
Dal:s Fished

Table 3. Random effects Erobit model Earameter estimates.
Alaskans
Estimates
t-ratios
-2.8415
3.03
Intercept
Price
-0.0124
7.39
0.0371
3.30
Whalibut
0.1037
4.32
Wchinook
0.1242
2.95
Wcoho
2
-0.0001
2.88
Whalibut
2
-0.0006
3.41
Wchinook
2
-0.0008
1.13
Wcoho
-0.0005
3.50
WhalibutWchinook
-0.0007
2.84
WhalibutWcoho
-0.0018
3.60
W chinook W coho
Halibut
1.1033
2.05
Halibut2
-0.1492
2.19
Per-Capita Household income
0.0945
1.09
Gender (l =male)
2.03
0.3853
Age
1.04
0.0080
Education (l =col/ege graduate)
0.2827
1.39
0.192
2.77
P

Nonresidents
t-ratios
Estimates
-1.4746
1.86
-0.0094
6.96
0.0228
2.53
0.0732
3.56
0.1163
3.19
-0.0001
1.33
-0.0004
2.52
-0.0011
1.82
-0.0004
3.20
-0.0005
2.38
-0.0010
2.26
0.9241
2.33
-0.1297
2.52
0.0021
0.04
0.57
0.0963
0.0003
0.05
0.3853
2.49
0.192
2.77

20
Table 4. Mean Fishing Trip Attributes by Residencya.
Halibut
Residency
All Species
Ave. Trip
Only Trips
Alaskan
$56.52
$66.82
Fishing Cost
1.71
Halibut Catch
2.62
34.18
Halibut Size (lbs.)
33.13
Chinook salmon Catch
0.19
28.34
Chinook salmon Size (lbs.)
0.06
Coho salmon Catch
10.60
Coho salmon Size (lbs.)
Nonresident
$130.71
Fishing Cost
2.43
Halibut Catch
42.66
Halibut Size (lbs.)
Chinook salmon Catch
0.14
Chinook salmon Size (lbs.)
30.87
Coho salmon Catch
0.31
Coho salmon Size (lbs.)
9.60
a The data are based on Herrmann et al. 2001b.

$144.18
2.90
41.82

Table 5. Percentage changes in days fished per year in response to changes in catch, with ±90%
confidence bounds*.
Alaskans
Nonresidents
Change in Catch
Mean
-90%
+90%
-90%
Mean
All Species Tripsa
-20%
-21.16
-34.41
-10.22
-13.96
-8.77
-10%
-9.32
-4.35
-16.26
-5.82
-3.46
+4.00
+1.97
+10%
+6.97
+2.92
+ 13.56
+20%
+11.97
+23.915
+6.64
+2.97
+4.86

+90%
-19.90
-8.93
+7.08
+12.64

Halibut Only Tripsb
-20%
-13.12
-14.71
-8.47
-22.43
-5.56
-23 .08
-10%
-5.28
-2.06
-10.60
-6.14
-3.19
-10.09
+10%
3.42
1.15
7.94
4.18
1.57
8.26
+20%
5.55
1.73
13.66
6.84
1.71
14.88
a Based of All Modes trips from Table 3.
b Based on Halibut Only trips from Table 3.
* Confidence Intervals are based on the Krinsky-Robb Monte Carlo method with 10,000 draws.

Table 6. Compensating variation per day and total annual compensating variation.
Residency Category
Mean CV per Day
Sportfishing Days
Alaskans
$80.33
110,586
Nonresidents
$118.88
86,970
Total
197,556

Total CV
$8,883,873
$10,338,807
$19,222,680
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Table 7.

Changes in compensating variation in response to changes in expected catches of all species.

Simulated Change to Expected Catch

Mean CV per Day

Sportfishing Days

Total CV

Change in Total CV

-30%

Alaskans
Nonresidents
Total

$35.51
$64.56

71,658
65,397
137,055

$2,544,229
$4,221,858
$6,766,087

-$6,339,644
-$6,116,949
-$12,456,593

-20%

Alaskans
Nonresidents
Total

$49.43
$83.62

87,185
74,828
162,013

$4,309,659
$6,257,338
$10,566,997

-$4,574,213
-$4,081,469
-$8,655,683

-10%

Alaskans
Nonresidents
Total

$64.63
$102.08

100,276
81,911
182,187

$6,481,120
$8,361,115
$14,842,235

-$2,402,753
-$1,977,692
-$4,380,445

0%

Alaskans
Nonresidents
Total

$80.83
$118.88

110,586
86,970
197,556

$8,883,873
$10,338,807
$19,222,680

$0
$0
$0

+10%

Alaskans (non-local)
Nonresidents
Total

$95.86
$133.30

118,289
90,447
208,736

$11,338,736
$12,056,188
$23,394,925

$2,454,863
$1,717,382
$4,172,245

+20%

Alaskans
Nonresidents
Total

$110.68
$144.85

123,821
92,748
216,569

$13,703,075
$13,434,175
$27,137,250

$4,819,202
$3,095,369
$7,914,571

Table 8. Compensating variation per day associated with changes in expected catch, with ±90%
confidence bounds.
Change in
Catch
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
+10%
+20%

Alaskans
Mean
$35.51
$49.43
$64.63
$80.83
$95.86
$110.68

-90%
$16.45
$25.27
$35.46
$45.75
$57.79
$68.97

Nonresidents
+90%
$65.52
$83.10
$102.40
$121.63
$140.50
$158.14

Mean
$64.56
$83.62
$102.08
$118.88
$133.30
$144.85

-90%
$44.46
$58.16
$72.94
$84.90
$98.40
$110.05

+90%
$89.74
$114.03
$137.23
$157.22
$171.64
$183.76
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Figure I, The affect of decreased (increased) per-day fishing trip costs (Price) on participation by resident
and nonresident anglers. (All catch and size variables are at the survey mean levels).
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Figure 2. The effect of decreased (increased) mean catch-per-trip on participation by resident and
nonresident anglers. (All catch and size variables are at the survey mean levels).
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Abstract

Changes in sportfishing trip attributes such as cost, harvest regulations, environmental quality, and
resource abundance, affect both the expected net benefits associated with a fishing trip and participation
decisions. The ability to estimate both of these is important for various types of policy analysis. This
study uses stated preference questions of anglers who sport fished in the marine waters off the Kenai
Peninsula, Alaska to estimate a nonlinear random effects probit model that expresses both angler net
benefits and participation rates as functions of trip attributes. The use of stated preference data along with
a nonlinear utility specification allows for the simulation of a wide range of policy scenarios. The study
design permits the identification of substitution and complementary effects across fishing trip attributes,
as well as non-linear marginal utility.

Keywords: Compensating variation, Participation Rate, Random effects probit, Sport fishery, Stated
preference method
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Introduction
The modeling and results presented are based on a stated preference survey. Each angler was presented a
set of possible fishing trips that vary in their levels of trip attributes. Anglers were asked to identify which
trips they would take. The attributes evaluated included the target species (Pacific halibut-Hippoglossus

stenolepis, chinook salmon-Oncorhynchus tshawytscha, and coho salmon-D. kisutch), the number and
size offish caught, and the cost of the trip. The advantage of this' approach is that it is possible to
construct experimental designs that allow for substitution and complementary effects across attributes,
and that allow for the possibility of non-linear marginal utility. These types of effects are often difficult to
capture from observed activity where attributes can be highly collinear or lack sufficient variation. We
elicit preferences on a trip-by-trip basis through a binary choice variable that indicates whether the angler
would take the trip that is presented. This design results in a panel type data set.
We use the estimated parameters from a random effects probit model to simulate changes in
participation rates, as well as angler welfare (compensating variation), associated with changes in the
fishing trip attributes. The ability to simulate angler welfare is important for benefit-cost analyses of
regulations and natural resource damage assessment. The ability to forecast changes in participation rates
is also important in many policy settings and for economic impact or input-output analyses. Participation
rate forecasts provide a crucial link between a change in the characteristics of a fishery and the resulting
change in economic activity.
Several current policy initiatives in Alaska have highlighted the importance of modeling the value of
recreational fisheries and angler participation rates. One example is the leasing of offshore drilling rights.
Such leases require an economic impact analysis that describes how local communities would be affected
by oil spills (Cohen, Herrmann et al. 2001a). Since an oil spill may affect recreational catch rates, it is
important to understand how this would translate into changes in angler welfare and participation rates.
Such information can then be used in both benefit-cost and economic impact analyses.
Another example is the Pacific halibut allocation issue faced by the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council (Council) in Alaska between commercial and sport catches of halibut. (On the
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Kenai Peninsula, this issue has become further complicated by a recent rural preference ruling, which will
place a greater importance on the subsistence fisheries (Manning and Little)). During the past two
decades, the share of halibut catch taken by the sport fishery has grown from less than two percent to over
18%. The Council has considered several measures to constrain further expansion of the sport catch, such
as bag limit reductions, season restrictions, and limits on the number of rods per boat (NPFMC) and has
also indicated an interest in development of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) for charter operators.
However, the effectiveness of these measures is dependent on how responsive anglers are to changes in
these trip attributes. Consequently, the ability to forecast changes in participation rates is important in
many policy settings.
Previous studies have used demographic characteristics to explain changes in the demand for
recreational fishing (Holland and Ditton; Aas; Thunberg et al.). The disadvantage of these models is that
the resulting forecasts are conditional on conjectures about demographic change. That is, such models
simply shift the focus from forecasting changes in participation to predicting demographic change.
Moreover, demography-based participation models are ill-suited for predicting changes in the demand for
recreational fishing that might arise in response to changes in trip costs, fishing conditions, or
management actions. Our approach avoids these problems by focusing on explanatory variables that are
subject to direct control. Consequently, our model is better suited for policy evaluation and for forecasting
participation rate responses to changes in trip costs and catch rates.
In the next section we present the econometric model. We then discuss the study design and data
collection. Two result sections are then presented: one for changes in participation and another for
changes in angler welfare. We have summary and concluding remarks at the end.
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